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*
This phrase was taken from an address given by Professor Henry T. King, Jr., of
Case Western Reserve University School of Law, at the McLean Lecture, University of
Pittsburgh Law School. In that speech, he stated:
Nuremberg was right, and it was just. It was a revolutionary break with
the shackles of the past, and it grew out of the conviction that there was a
better way. We saw the stars at Nuremberg and the vision of a secure world
under a rule of law. Let that vision always remain with us, and let us always
keep our eyes on the stars.
Henry T. King, Jr., The Meaning of Nuremberg, in 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 143, 148
(1998).
** Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center, 2000, J.D., cum laude,
Florida International University 1996, BA. Ms. Kearns is an associate with Shutts & Bowen,
LLP, practicing in government relations and commercial litigation. The author would like to
thank Professors James Wilets and Douglas Donoho for their incites and debates throughout
the formation of this article.
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INTRODUCTION

The use of the word "sovereignty" historically referred to the
relationship between the rulers of a country and the persons over whom they
ruled. Yet, over time, this idea grew to its modem understanding as a
description of the relationship between states.2
Commentators have
criticized the creation of this new meaning as "an illegitimate offspring" 3 but
regardless, it is used and perceived as both a sword and a shield to protect a
state from the evils it perceives from other states. The legitimacy of a state's
ability to hide behind its sovereignty has been to be challenged over the past
half century as we witness an evolution to a new idea of what role a state's
sovereignty should play.4
This article will explore the role state sovereignty plays in the evolving
international human rights arena. Specifically, it will address the concept of
universal jurisdiction and how its growing acceptance cuts into a state's
ability to cry sovereign. Part I will begin with a brief discussion of the
evolution of state sovereignty into this modem day wall separating states.
This section will also describe the methods by which states use their
sovereignty as a defense from scrutiny or review through the development
and use of such concepts as the act of state doctrine and sovereign immunity.
Part III will address the concept of universal jurisdiction through a
discussion of its history and development over time. Included in this section
will be a discussion of the recent revival of the controversies which surround
the use of universal jurisdiction with Spain's attempt to prosecute General
Augusto Pinochet Ugarte for his part in the systematic widespread human
rights violations against the people of Chile while under his control. Part IV
will analyze the state's effect on sovereignty when it invokes universal
jurisdiction to review and judge actions that occur in other states. Although
it is the view of the author that the expansion of universal jurisdiction is
eroding the idea of sovereignty, this article will conclude by explaining why
this doctrine of jurisdiction alone can not, and will not, be its demise.

1.
Louis Henkin, That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human
Rights, Et Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 2 (1999).
2.
The use of the word "states" throughout this article will be used in its
international context, which refers to other countries, and not to any individual American
state.
3.
Henkin, supra note 1, at 2.
4.
See generally id. at 1-14.
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II.

A.

STATE SOVEREIGNTY

Historically

The historical use of the word sovereignty referred to the Fersons
having independent and supreme authority over those they ruled. This
meant that the Queen of England, for example, was the sovereign, but only
with respect to her subjects, not to other states. 6 Sovereignty was a domestic
term used in a domestic context; it had no international meaning.7
Through the centuries, however, this concept of sovereignty was
expanded to its modern understanding as a description of the relationship
between states.8 Under this view, we saw the creation of a new legal
concern: that of a state and the protection of its very existence. This was an
important shift because this new understanding of sovereignty was very
powerful. It became a widely accepted principle which governments and
courts used as a means of avoiding judgment or review by other states,
through the development and use of related attributes of sovereignty, such as
sovereign immunity and the act of state doctrine. 9 Because of the very
existence of this new legal concern-that of the state and its territofy-states
had to develop the means by which to ensure their survival.
B.

Defenses Createdout of State Sovereignty

With the development of this concept of absolute sovereignty by
nations came the creation of two notable legal doctrines: the act of state
doctrine and sovereign immunity. These two legal theories, although not
founded solely on the principle of sovereignty, lose their necessity as the
concept of sovereignty loses its power. Each has at its core the idea that the
sovereign-the state-is not to be judged.

5.

See id.

6.
7.
8.
9.

Id.
at2.
See id.
Henkin, supra note 1, at 2.
See text and accompanying notes infra Part II.B.
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Sovereign Immunity

The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that domestic courts
should decline to hear a case against a foreign sovereign.' 0 It evolved out of
the idea that the "king can do no wrong."" Historically this immunity was
absolute in that a foreign court could not hear the case no matter what the
acts complained of may have been, or what injuries were caused. 2 In recent
history, however, this immunity has been somewhat restricted. The
predominant understanding now is that a sovereign state is only immune
from those cases that
involve injuries resulting from the sovereign's
3
governmental actions.
This trend of restricting the ability of a state to hide behind sovereign
immunity developed out of need. Historically the state was only involved4
with such things as tax collection, national defense, and law enforcement.'
However, as the modem state became more involved in the commercial
arena, it became apparent that persons needed an avenue of redress when
that state failed to perform its obligations on its commercial contracts.' 5
Additionally, as a result of the egregious acts committed during World
War II, the international community agreed that states need to be
accountable and responsible for the international crimes they commit.16 It is
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1994); see, e.g., Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 1330-32, 1391, 1602-11 (1994); United Kingdom State Immunity Act, 1978,
reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1123 (1978); Canadian State Immunity Act of 1982, reprinted in 21
I.L.M. 798 (1982); Australian Foreign States Immunities Act 1985, reprintedin 25 I.L.M. 715
(1986). Within this context, the use of the word "sovereign" encompasses the state, its
officers, its agencies, or its instrumentalities. RAY AUGUST, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW
123 (2d ed. 1997).
11. William R. Dorsey, III, Reflections on the ForeignSovereign Immunities Act After
Twenty Years, 28 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 257, 257 (1997). Additional bases for this legal
principle are comity and mutuality between sovereigns. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of
Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) (noting that foreign sovereign immunity is viewed as a
"matter of grace and comity on the part of the United States").
12. AUGUST, supra note 10, at 123; see also The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11
U.S. 116 (1812). The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is the sole basis for subject matter
jurisdiction over a foreign state and its instrumentalities in a United States court. See
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439 (1989).
13. AUGUST, supra note 10, at 124.
14. Id. at 123.
15. Id. at 123-24.
16. See Hari M. Osofsky, Foreign Sovereign Immunity from Severe Human Rights
Violations: New Directionsfor Common Law Based Approaches, 11 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 35,
50 (1998).
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this idea that has helped foster the expansion of crimes subject to a state
invoking universal jurisdiction, and as a result, has allowed for a slight
erosion to the traditional notions of sovereignty.
The application of this belief, however, has proven to be much more
difficult in practice since the issue of sovereign immunity was not addressed
in the human rights treaties ratified after the war.17 Many of the treaties
provide for enforcement either through some international body, or through
the use of the appropriate state's national courts when handling internal
obligations, yet there were 18no discussions of a state's ability to take
jurisdiction over another state.
To complicate this further, none of the states that codified some form of
the restricted sovereign immunity concept ever provided an explicit
exception for human rights violations.' 9 In practice, this proved to be a brick
wall in that numerous cases were dismissed or subsequently reversed on the
basis of sovereign immunity. 2° However, in 1996, the United States stepped
up to correct this error by amending the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
to provide an explicit exception for a civil suit to be brought against a
sovereign for "personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture,
extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, [or] hostage taking... .,,2 Although
this exception is a step in the right direction, it is important to note that it
merely provides for a civil remedy to obtain money damages for the
wrongful acts of a foreign sovereign. It does not provide for an exception
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 38.
20. See, e.g., Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993) (holding that states
are presumptively immune from a court's jurisdiction and that the only method of obtaining
jurisdiction in the United States courts is under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act); Von
Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 736 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1990) (dismissing the

case on sovereign immunities grounds, citing six reasons why the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act does not apply). In Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, the Ninth Circuit

reversed the district court, which had dismissed the case on sovereign immunity grounds. 965
F.2d 699, 723 (9th Cir. 1992). The Ninth Circuit held that, in this limited fact situation,

Argentina had impliedly waived its right to the sovereign immunity defense because it had
previously sought the assistance of the United States courts. Id. at 720-23. For a detailed
discussion of the treatment of human rights cases under the doctrine of sovereign immunity in
other states, see generally Osofsky, supra note 16.

21.

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, § 221,

110 Stat. 1214, 1241 (1996) (amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (Supp. IV 1998)).
22. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (Supp. IV 1998) (providing that "[a] foreign state

shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States... in which money
damages are sought against a foreign state" for such acts as torture) (emphasis added).
Published by NSUWorks, 2001
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from immunity for criminal prosecution when the foreign state, through its
actors, commits these enumerated acts. Thus, this exception does not grant
jurisdiction to a United States court to universally prosecute a foreign
sovereign for its human rights violations, but merely prevents a foreign
sovereign from using immunity as a defense when the case is rightfully
before a United States court.23 Thus, the United States court must obtain
proper jurisdiction to hear the case by some other means. Only then will this
exception come into play by disallowing a defendant from arguing sovereign
immunity. Therefore, under current law, although a state may invoke
universal jurisdiction to prosecute those individuals, the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act still provides one more hurdle for that state to overcome.
Despite no explicit exception to sovereign immunity under the statute, it
has been argued that a person should not be permitted to assert a sovereign
immunity defense in a criminal prosecution for human rights violations.2
This argument is premised on the underlying purpose of the sovereign
23. This statute explicitly provides that the human rights exception cannot be used if
the actions alleged were committed solely in the territory of the foreign sovereign and neither
the claimant nor the victim is a United States national. See § 1605(a)(7)(B)(i)-(ii). However,
people in those situations are not closed off to civil remedies in the United States court
system. Under the Alien Tort Claim Act, an alien may initiate a lawsuit in the United States
seeking civil damages against another alien for actions that occurred in a foreign state. See 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
24. Willard B. Cowles, Universality of Jurisdiction over War Crimes, 33 CAL. L.
REv. 177, 194 (1945) (noting that war criminals take advantage of the fact that often there is
no well-organized police or judicial system where the act is committed, and therefore they
hope to commit their crimes with impunity); see also Jodi Horowitz, Comment, Regina v.
Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others Ex Parte
Pinochet: Universal Jurisdiction and Sovereign Immunity for Jus Cogens Violations, 23
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 489 (1999) (discussing Prefecture of Voiotia v. Fed. Republic of
Germany, Case No. 137/1997 (Court of First Instance of Leivadia, Greece, 1997)). In
Prefecture of Voiotia, the Greek court held that a state should deny immunity for certain
violations of human rights because the sovereign could not have reasonably expected to
receive immunity for such grave violations of international law, and therefore it constructively
waived its privilege when it committed the egregious acts. Id. at 510. Additionally, the court
noted that when such acts are committed, the sovereign is not acting within its authority and
therefore should not be able to hide behind its sovereignty. Id. at 510-11. The United States
Supreme Court, however, rejected an implied waiver argument by holding that the Argentine
government did not implicitly waive its immunity by signing certain treaties. See Argentine
Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 442-43 (1989). In that decision,
the Court stated "[n]or do we see how a foreign state can waive its immunity under
§ 1605(a)(1) by signing an international agreement that contains no mention of a waiver of
immunity to suit in United States courts or even the availability of a cause of action in the
United States." Id.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol25/iss2/8

6

Kearns: Breaking the Shackles of the Past: The Role and Future of State S

2Kearns

2001]

immunity doctrine and the rationale for its current limitations. Just as a

sovereign is not immune from inquiries into its commercial contracts since
those are distinguished from its official acts, so too should the sovereign be

subject to prosecution for its human rights violations, as those actions are not
within the ambit of any state's official acts. However, until such time as this
becomes a recognized exception to sovereign immunity, there is always the

chance that no justice will be served.
In addition to the overall sovereign, immunity exception, there is also

the subset of head of state immunity. Althcugh this doctrine is legally
distinct from state immunity,25 its force as a viable defense against
prosecutions for human rights violations is questionable. The Nuremberg
Charter, enacted after World War II, provided that "[t]he official position of
defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in
Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from
responsibility or mitigating punishment. 2 6 This principle was recently

reaffirmed by the creation of the international tribunals in both the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 27 Yet, even if a state successfully overcomes these

two jurisdictional hurdles, it will then face another potential defense-the
act of state doctrine.

2.

The Act of State Doctrine

The act of state doctrine is a judicial doctrine which precludes
American courts from inquiring into the validity of another foreign

sovereign's acts when those acts are committed within that foreign

25. Jerrold L. Mallory, Resolving the Confusion over Head of State Immunity: The
Defined Rights of Kings, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 170-71 (1986) (noting that heads of state
are no longer viewed as actual states); Horowitz, supra note 24, at 505 ("[t]he state, rather
than its ruler, is the primary subject of international law, and is thus protected by immunity").
26. Charter of the Int'l Military Tribunal, annexed to the Agreement for the Prosecution
and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 7, 59 Stat.
1544, 1556, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 288 [hereinafter the Nuremberg Charter].
27. See Statute for the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia,
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/INF/49 (1993) [hereinafter
ICFY Statute]; United Nations: Secretary-General's Report on Aspects of Establishing an
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, May 3,
1993, 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1175; Statutefor the InternationalCriminalTribunalfor Rwanda, S.C.
Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. SC/5974 (1994), reprinted in 33
I.L.M. 1598, 1604 [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
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territory.2 This doctrine differs from sovereign immunity in that sovereign
immunity operates to deprive a court of jurisdiction to hear a case; whereas,
in contrast, the act of state doctrine does not defeat a court's jurisdiction, but
rather, merely precludes inquiry on certain issues. 29 Although this is a
doctrine used
in the American court system, many other states have similar
30
concepts.

There are several justifications for the act of state doctrine.
Traditionally, it was seen as an offspring of sovereignty and a means to

protect the importance of sovereign authority.31 Other justifications for this

doctrine include conity32 and the separation of powers. 33 Comity is an
international principle based on reciprocity. Simply stated, it is the idea that
we, as a sovereign government, do not want to tell others how to rule their
country because we do not want them to tell us how to rule ours.34 Separation
of powers also comes into play because the United States Constitution vests
the executive branch with the exclusive right to conduct foreign affairs;
therefore, the judiciary is not authorized to review those actions.35
Originally, when the term sovereign spoke of the relationship between the
28. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 34 (6th ed. 1990).
29. Ricaud v. Am. Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918). The Supreme Court noted in
that decision that the act of state doctrine:
[D]oes not deprive the courts of jurisdiction once acquired over a case. It
requires only that, when it is made to appear that the foreign government has
acted in a given way on the subject-matter of the litigation, the details of such
action or the merit of the result cannot be questioned but must be accepted by
our courts as a rule for their decision. To accept a ruling authority and to
decide accordingly is not a surrender or abandonment of jurisdiction but is an
exercise of it.
Id.
30. See, e.g., Regina v. Bartle, 37 I.L.M. 1302, 1331-32 (H.L. 1998) (reviewing
several variations of the act of state doctrine and recognizing that certain questions of foreign
affairs remain nonjusticiable).
31. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (noting that "[e]very
sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State...").
32. Comity is the "[riecognition that one sovereignty allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive, or judicial act of another sovereignty, having due regard to rights of its
own citizens." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed. 1990).
33. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp. Int'l, 493 U.S. 400, 404
(1990).
34.
"In general, [the] principle of 'comity' is that courts of one state or jurisdiction
will give effect to laws and judicial decisions of another state or jurisdiction, not as a matter of
obligation but out of deference and mutual respect." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed.
1990) (citing Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 571 P.2d 689, 695 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977)).
35. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., 493 U.S. at 404.
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government and its people, the idea of this doctrine was that the sovereign
made the law and therefore we could not challenge it. As the concept of
sovereignty expanded, this doctrine came to be understood as the absence of
a foreign government's right to enter another state and judge its actions.
Traditionally, the act of state doctrine required that United States
federal courts accept, without question, the validity of a foreign sovereign's
acts of state that were performed in that sovereign's territory. 6 The United
States Supreme Court explained this doctrine by stating:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not
sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done
within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such
acts must be obtained through the means37open to be availed of by
sovereign powers as between themselves.
Years later, the Supreme Court reexamined the doctrine in a case that
arose out of the Cuban expropriations of American assets. 38 In Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,39 the Supreme Court noted that
"constitutional underpinnings" compel adherence to the act of state doctrine,
specifically, the constitutional mandate on separation of powers. 4 0 However,
the Court put an end to the prior categorical approach to this doctrine and
replaced it with a case-by-case analysis, in which a three-part test would be
used to determine when the doctrine should be applied .41
This test, a form of "balanc[ing] of relevant considerations" looked to
whether adjudication of any given issue would interfere with the nation's
foreign affairs. 42 In deciding whether to apply the act of state doctrine, the
court must balance: 1) the degree of codification regarding the international
legal principle in question; 2) the impact of the matter on United States
foreign relations; and 3) the status of the foreign government whose act is
allegedly implicated.43 The Court articulated this test by stating:

36. See Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); Ricaud v. Am. Metal Co.,
246 U.S. 304 (1918); Underhill v. Hemandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
37. Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252.

38.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
376 U.S. 398 (1964).
Id. at 423.
Id. at 427.
Id.
Id.
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It should be apparent that the greater the degree of codification or
consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the
more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions
regarding it, since the courts can then focus on the application of an
agreed principle to circumstances of fact rather than on the
sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with the
national interest or with international justice. It is also evident that
some aspects of international law touch much more sharply on
national nerves than do others; the less important the implications
of an issue are for our foreign relations, the weaker the justification
for exclusivity in the political branches. 44
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Sabbatino, the act of state
doctrine has been litigated in numerous decisions, although rarely making it
to the United States Supreme Court. 45 In its latest decision, the Supreme
Court has slightly deviated from its holding in Sabbatino by articulating a
threshold question that must be satisfied prior to a court embarking on the
46
Sabbatino balancing test.
The Court held that the proper question at the
outset is whether adjudication requires inquiry into the validity of the public
act of a foreign sovereign. 47 If the challenged acts are found to qualify as
acts of state, then the Sabbatino balancing test can be applied to limit the
doctrine's applicability." The Court articulated this distinction by stating:
Courts in the United States have the power, and ordinarily the
obligation, to decide cases and controversies properly presented to
them. The act of state doctrine does not establish an exception for

44. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
45. The United States Supreme Court has only addressed the act of state doctrine in
three cases since its decision in Sabbatino. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics
Corp. Int'l, 493 U.S. 400 (1990); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682
(1976); First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972). The United
States Legislature reversed the effect of the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Sabbatino by enacting the Hickenlooper Amendment, also known as the Sabbatino
Amendment. See 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1994). This amendment requires United States
courts to adjudicate takings claims if the foreign government does not provide "speedy
compensation" for the property taken despite a claim of defense under the act of state doctrine.
Id. However, although this amendment reversed the outcome of the Supreme Court's decision
in Sabbatino, it did nothing to affect how the act of state doctrine is to be applied in future
decisions by United States courts for matters that do not involve a property taking.
46. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., 493 U.S. at 409.
47. Id.
48. See id.
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cases and controversies that may embarrass foreign governments,
but merely requires that, in the process of deciding, the acts of
foreign sovereigns
taken within their own jurisdictions shall be
49
deemed valid.

Under the above analysis, it appears that a foreign sovereign would not
be able to successfully use this doctrine to defeat a United States court from
hearing a human rights case against it. With the addition of the threshold
question a court must answer to determine whether the further balancing of
interests must be entered into, one can make a tighter argument that the act
of state doctrine should not defeat the court's ability to hear a human rights
case. Clearly, a state's actions of committing human rights violations could
not and should not be deemed "acts of state." By a court holding that such
actions are not acts of state, the court would not need to continue further into
the balancing test, and thus it would not be precluded from hearing the case.
However, until such time as the arguments are made and precedent is
set, both sovereign immunity and the act of state doctrine represent two
types of hurdles persons seeking punishment for human rights abuses must
overcome. With the expansion of universal jurisdiction, the threat of a case
being dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds weakens. Additionally,
with the United States' new articulation of the appropriate use of the act of
state doctrine, this, too, is no longer impossible to overcome.

m.

UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION

It is a basic premise of every legal system that a court must have
jurisdiction before it may decide a case. Jurisdiction is defined as "'the
authority of states to prescribe their law, to subject persons and things to
adjudication in their courts and other tribunals, and to enforce their law, both
judicially and nonjudicially."' 50 The jurisdictional principle of universality
provides that every state has the right to prosecute offenders under its
domestic laws for certain crimes even though the defendant and the victim
are not nationals of that state, or the alleged crime did not occur in that

49.
50.

Id.
Christopher C. Joyner, Arresting Impunity: The Casefor Universal Jurisdiction

in Bringing War Criminals to Accountability, 59 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 163 (1996)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF Tm FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS, pt. IV, Introductory Note (1987)).
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state.5 1 These crimes are considered to be of such a universal concern and
mutual threat5 2 to all states that every nation has an interest in punishing the
perpetrators.
A.

HistoricalDevelopment of UniversalJurisdiction

The principal of universal jurisdiction was first developed as a means of
Pirates were considered hostis
punishing pirates and slave traders.5
humanis generis, enemies of mankind, and any nation could assume
jurisdiction over them 4 The rationale behind the development of universal
jurisdiction to this offense was based on the fact that the offenses were
committed on the high seas and not within the territorial jurisdiction of any
particular state. 5 Slave trading is also an offense that is subject to every
state's jurisdiction. 6 Through the use of various treaties, the international
community agreed that despite the fact that slave trading did not threaten

commerce or navigation between nations in the same manner as piracy, this
offense was of such a heinous nature that it was subject to prosecution in
every state. 7
51. Kenneth C. Randall, Universal JurisdictionUnder International Law, 66 TEX L.
REv. 785, 788 (1988). Universal jurisdiction is only one of five principles of jurisdiction a
state can use to have the authority to hear a case. These extraterritorial jurisdiction principles
are:
(1) [T]he territoriality principle, which applies when an offense occurs within
the territory of the prosecuting state; (2) the nationality principle, which
admits jurisdiction when the offender is a national or resident of the
prosecuting state; (3) the protective principle, which permits jurisdiction
where an extraterritorial act threatens interests that are vital to the integrity of
the prosecuting state; (4) the passive personality principle, which recognizes
jurisdiction where the victim is a national of the prosecuting state; and (5) the
universality principle, which holds that some crimes are so universally
abhorrent and thus condemned that their perpetrators are hostis humani
generis-enemies of all people-and allows that jurisdiction may be based
solely on securing custody of the perpetrator.
Joyner, supra note 50, at 164-65 (internal citations omitted).
52. Joyner, supra note 50, at 165.
53. See Randall, supra note 51, at 788.
54. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
55. Joyner, supra note 50, at 165 n.48.
56. Randall, supra note 51, at 798.
57. Id. at 800; see, e.g., Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, Sept.
25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, 60 U.N.T.S. 253; Protocol Amending the Slavery Convention, Dec.
7, 1953, 7 U.S.T. 479, 182 U.N.T.S. 51; Supplementary Convention of the Abolition of
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It was not until the conclusion of the second World War, however, that
the concept of universal jurisdiction began to truly develop. As World War
Hf came to an end, and the international community became aware of the
atrocities comnitted, the cries of "never again" became the theme.5 8 The
international community drafted the Nuremberg Charter of 1945
("Nuremberg Charter"), 59 which permitted the piercing of a state's

sovereignty in order to hold a foreign individual accountable, regardless of
his or her position as a head of state or a government official, for crimes

against peace, crimes against the laws of war, and crimes against humanity.Y6
The significance of the Nuremberg Charter not only paved the way for the
establishment of ad hoc tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo to prosecute
persons charged with these crimes, but it also sparked a growth in the desire

treaties aimed at the codification of. international humanitarian
to enact
61
law.

The majority of the treaties passed, and the trials that took place never
directly made reference to the use of universal jurisdiction, 62 although it is
generally agreed that this was the appropriate justification for the
63
establishment of the tribunals and the various proceedings. It was not until

Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 18
U.S.T. 3201, 266 U.N.T.S. 3.
58. In the days following the liberation of the Nazi concentration camps throughout
Germany, Austria, and Poland, the world became aware of, and was astounded by, the
revelation of the millions of Jewish people and Gypsies that had been exterminated by the
Nazis as a direct result of the policies of the German State under Adolph Hitler's "Final
Solution." See generally YvEs BEIGBEDER, JUDGING WAR CRIMINALS: THE POLITICS OF
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 29-31 (St. Martin's Press, Inc. 1999); DANIEL R. BROWER, THE
CENTURY: THE AGE OF GLOBAL WAR AND REVOLUTION 148-49 (2d
ed. Prentice-Hall 1992).
59. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 26.
60. Id.
61. Jamison G. White, Nowhere to Run, Nowhere to Hide: Augusto Pinochet,
UniversalJurisdiction,the ICC,and a Wake-Up Callfor FormerHeads of State, 50 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 127, 135 (1999).
62. In fact, the ability of the international community to even hold the trials
prosecuting various German officials in Nuremberg was ridiculed as being merely "victor's
justice." BEIGBEDER, supra note 58, at 38-41.
63. See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985). In Demjanjuk,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the United States could extradite Demjanjuk to
Israel for the crimes he committed when he was a guard at Treblinka, a Nazi concentration
camp in Poland, pursuant to Israel's exercise of universal jurisdiction. Id. at 584. The court
held that the acts committed by Demjanjuk were of such a universally recognized nature that
they were punishable by any member of the international community. Id. at 582.
WORLD IN THE TWENTIET
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several years later that such a clear use of universal jurisdiction would be
seen.6 Almost fifteen years after victory was declared, the world witnessed
one of the most controversial trials in its history when the State of Israel
kidnapped Adolph Eichmann from Argentina and invoked universal
jurisdiction to prosecute him for crimes against humanity. In its decision,
the Supreme Court of Israel stated:
Not only do all the crimes attributed to [Eichmann] bear an
international character, but their harmful and murderous effects
were so embracing and widespread as to shake the international
community to its very foundations. The State of Israel therefore
was entitled, pursuant to the principle of universal jurisdiction and
in the capacity of a guardian of international law and an agent for
its enforcement, to try [Eichmann]. 66
The creation of various international agreements following the
conclusion of the war also helped to solidify the principle of universal
jurisdiction by codifying various aspects of international humanitarian law.
The European Convention on Human Rights,67 the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide ("Genocide
Convention"), 68 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 69 are three
examples of such agreements.
Of these agreements, the Genocide
Convention was the most notable since it called for the international
condemnation of not only those acts specified in the Nuremberg Charter, but

64. See Attorney Gen. of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (D.C. Jm. 1961), aff'd 36
I.L.R. 277 (Isr. S. Ct. 1962).
65. Id. The controversy over this case surrounded Israel's actions of kidnapping
Eichmann from Argentina without Argentina's consent. See Randall, supra note 51, at 813.
Although Israel had a right, pursuant to universal jurisdiction, to prosecute Eichmann for the
crimes against humanity, universal jurisdiction did not give it the right to invade Agentina's
sovereignty in pursuit of that right. Id. Additionally, controversy arose over Israel's ability to
try Eichmann, since Israel was not in existence at the time the acts were committed. Id. at
813-14. Although this argument could have been used to negate other jurisdictional
principles, it is irrelevant when using universal jurisdiction. Id. at 814.
66. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. at 304.
67. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights & Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
68. Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045,78 U.N.T.S. 277.
69. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
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added the crime of genocide to the list of punishable offenses.
Additionally, the international community, through its concern over the acts
that were committed during the war, as well as the lack of any international
court to address such crimes, ratified the four Geneva Conventions of
1949. 7 1 Each of these treaties provide that the signatories are under an
obligation to either search for persons alleged to have committed grave
breaches and bring them to72 trial, or to extradite the offenders to another state
that is willing to try them.
The treaties codified the various crimes that the international
community believed to be of such importance as to demand worldwide
assistance in punishing the perpetrators. Over the next several decades,

numerous treaties were ratified to include additional acts which defined the
modern day enemy and therefore expanded the types of acts that are
considered universal. 3 The significance of these new additional crimes
were that they differed from piracy and slave trading in that they were not
international in nature. The new crimes were being committed within the

territorial jurisdiction of one state against the nationals of that state. Without
their inclusion into universal jurisdiction, any other foreign state lacked a
jurisdictional tie to prosecute these crimes when committed.

70. White, supra note 61, at 135 (citing the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 281-

83).
71. See Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316,75 U.N.T.S. 135
[hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention IV].
72. Geneva Convention I, supra note 71, art. 49, 6 U.S.T. at 3146, 75 U.N.T.S. at 62;
Geneva Convention II, supra note 71, art. 50, 6 U.S.T. at 3250, 75 U.N.T.S. at 116; Geneva
Convention III, supra note 71, art. 129, 6 U.S.T. at 3418, 75 U.N.T.S. at 236; Geneva
Convention IV, supra note 71, art. 146, 6 U.S.T. at 3616,75 U.N.T.S. at 386.
73. See infra Part IILB.
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CurrentEvolution

The momentum established after the war quickly dissipated, as the Cold
War went into full force. 74 In fact, even the four Geneva Conventions were
weakened by the failure on the part of the international community to
establish an international criminal court. The trend, however, to create new
international rules prevailed with the focus now on the new, contemporary
war criminal.
These new hostis humanis generis were committing
outrageous acts within the territory of a state and were too often even
empowered by that state. The battle against this new type of war criminal
provided the perfect basis for expansion of the doctrine of universality.
The international community first turned its aim at the growing crimes
of hijacking and aircraft sabotage.76 These treaties, although providing for
both protective and territorial jurisdiction, also hinted at the ability to use
universal jurisdiction. 77 Next came the International Convention on the
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid in 1973.78 This
convention defined apartheid as certain "inhuman acts committed for the
purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of
persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing
them." 79
It required the signatories to create domestic legislation
criminalizing the use of apartheid. 80 However, similar to the hijacking and
aircraft sabotage conventions, it does not explicitly mention universal
jurisdiction as a basis for a state to punish violators.8

74. White, supra note 61, at 135.
75. See, e.g., infra Part III.C, which details the legal problems Spain faced when it
attempted to prosecute Augusto Pinochet for his alleged role in the torturing and murdering of
persons in Chile between September 1973 and March 1990.
76. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177; Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; 1963
Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept.
14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219.
77. White, supra note 61, at 136 (stating that the 1970 Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft "mandat[ed] that no 'criminal jurisdiction
exercised in accordance with national law' is excluded").
78. Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 244.
79. Id. at 245, art. II.
80. See id. at 244.
81. White, supra note 61, at 136.
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In the 1970s and 1980s, this trend continued with a focus on terrorism
and torture. The International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages,8
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, 83 and the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, 84 each contain a provision, with slight variations,
that provides:
The State Party in the territory of which the alleged offender is
found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without
exception whatsoever and whether or not the offense was
committed in its territory, to submit the case to its competent

authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in
accordance with the laws of that State.85
Such a provision signifies the international community's willingness to rely
on the domestic courts of its nations to prosecute violators of these crimes.
These were the first treaties ratified that explicitly called for persons to be
tried in the national courts of various states around the world under that
state's laws. To facilitate this process, the treaties also required their
signatories
to pass appropriate domestic legislation prohibiting the same
86
conduct.
C.

Universal JurisdictionToday

The principle of universal jurisdiction for human rights violations has
recently come full circle with the creation of the International Criminal
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.87 This is the first time
since the Nuremberg Trials that an international body has been established to
prosecute violators of human rights. Although the existence and use of these
international tribunals to prosecute those individuals responsible for human
rights abuses does not rely on universal jurisdiction, it does solidify the list
of acts that the international community agrees should be punished. This can
82. Dec. 4, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1456.
83. Dec. 14, 1973,28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167.
84. G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc.
A/39/51 (1984).
85. Randall, supra note 51, at 819.
86. Id.
87. Both tribunals were set up by the United Nations Security Council. See ICFY
Statute, supra note 27; ICTR Statute, supra note 27.

Published by NSUWorks, 2001

17

Nova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 8

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 25:501

then be used by a state to justify its use of universal jurisdiction in
prosecuting other individuals that commit such egregious acts as genocide,
torture, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
The use and expansion of universal jurisdiction, however, took a step
backward with the recent legal battle in the English courts surrounding the
detention and attempted extradition of General Augusto Pinochet. On
October 16, 1998, while on a medical visit to the United Kingdom, General
Pinochet was arrested in London at the request of a Spanish court, which had
issued a provisional arrest warrant. 88 The warrant alleged that Pinochet was
responsible for systematic acts of murder, torture, disappearances, illegal
detention, and summary executions while he was President and Director of
the National Intelligence Directorate ("DINA").8 9 This extradition request
by Spain led to a legal battle that lasted approximately two years before
General Pinochet was released by the English courts and allowed to return to
his home in Chile. 90
During his seventeen years as the President of Chile, it is estimated that
more than 2000 people were killed and thousands more tortured by DINA
operatives at the direction of Pinochet in an effort to retain power. 91 Prior to
his resignation as President, the government of Chile enacted a new
constitution. 92 This not only created a position of senator for life for all expresidents who serve for over six years, but, more importantly, it
incorporated a general amnesty law which prohibited prosecution of any
individuals for crimes committed during the coup in 1973 through the
88.

For a detailed discussion of the history surrounding General Pinochet's rise to

power and the human rights violations which formed the basis for Spain's attempt to prosecute
him, see Nehal Bhuta, Justice Without Borders? Prosecuting General Pinochet, 23 MELB. U.
L. REV. 499 (1999).

89.

Id.at513.

90.

See, e.g., Ray Moseley, Ailing Ex-Dictator Pinochet Heads Home to Chile:

ExtraditionEffort is Dead, But Foes Still Want a Trial, NEW ORLEANs TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar.
3, 2000, at A8; Tim Vandenack, Pinochet Faces Future in Santiago: Freed Ex-dictator
Could Encounter Human Rights Charges as He Comes Home to Friends and Foes, SUNSENTNEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Mar. 3, 2000, at IA; Key Dates in Saga that Cost Pounds 15m,
SCOT. DAILY RECORD, Mar. 3, 2000, at 11, available at 2000 WL 13728918 (detailing the
chronology of events from Pinochet's arrest to his release). The legal battle to prosecute
Pinochet for his human rights violations continues as Chile has now sought to have him
charged in its domestic courts. See Jonathan Franklin, Pinochet Put Under House Arrest: ExdictatorIndicted ForHis Role in Hit Squad Murders, TE GUARDIAN, Jan. 30, 2001.
91. See Bhuta, supra note 88, at 508 (citing the Chilean National Commission on
Truth and Reconciliation).
92. Id. at 509.
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dissolution of DINA in 1978. 93 This law meant that Pinochet could not be
prosecuted in Chile for his human rights violations.94

Upon hearing that Pinochet was in London for back surgery, action was
taken by a human rights organization to notify the Spanish prosecutors that
were investigating alleged human rights violations in Chile and Argentina
against Spanish citizens. 95 On October 13, 1998, Spanish Judge Garzon
issued a provisional international arrest warrant and requested that England
detain General Pinochet pending a formal extradition request. 96 Pinochet
was subsequently arrested and he immediately applied for judicial review
and habeas corpus. 97 The legal issues raised in the courts in England

involved: 1) whether Spain had jurisdiction to hear the case; 98 2) whether
Pinochet was immune from prosecution due to the fact that the alleged acts
were committed while Pinochet was President, and thus a head of state; 99
and 3) whether the arrest warrants listed
an offense for which England could
1°

rightfully extradite Pinochet to Spain. 0
The English High Court granted immunity to Pinochet as a former
sovereign and head of state, and thus it held that he could not be extradited

to Spain.'0 '

In its decision, the High Court distinguished its grant of

93.

Id. (citing Decree Law No. 2191, Apr. 19, 1978).

94.

Id. at 510 (noting that the amnesty law was subsequently upheld by Chile's

Supreme Court as constitutional and-thus has been successful at barring any prosecutions for
human rights violations that fell within the amnesty time period).
95. Id. at 513.
96. Bhuta, supranote 88, at 513.
97. Id.
98. In re Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. 68 (Q.B. Div'l Ct. 1998). This issue detailed whether
Spain could legally prosecute General Pinochet for human rights violations that occurred
within Chile. Although Spain prefaced its charges with the allegation that the acts were
committed against Spanish citizens living in Chile, thus making the argument that the Spanish
court has jurisdiction based on passive personality, universal jurisdiction was discussed and
recognized by the English courts as a means of finding jurisdiction in the Spanish court. See
id.; see also Joyner, supranote 50, at 163-65.
99. In addition, Pinochet also enjoyed the title of senator for life, and thus raised the
additional legal question of whether a current head of state could be prosecuted. See In re
Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. at 80.
100. As explained by the English High Court, for the crime to be extraditable under
English law, the defendant must have committed a crime that is an extraditable offense under
both Spanish law and English law. See Bhuta, supra note 88, at 513-14. Although this article
does not address in detail this aspect of the English decision, the process the English courts
used to analyze the issue raised questions of what crimes were considered international crimes
and thus subject to extradition by England.
101. In re Pinochet,38 I.L.M. at 85.
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immunity for Pinochet as a head of state from the current international view
that precludes head of state immunity for certain crimes. 10 2 The High Court
held that although heads of state have been subject to criminal prosecutions,
those prosecutions were the result of international agreements and thus one
sovereign state was not being judged by another sovereign state. 103 In
Pinochet, however, it was not an international1 body
seeking to prosecute
4
Pinochet, but rather the sovereign state of Spain. 0
On appeal, however, the House of Lords reversed the High Court and
held that Pinochet was not immune as a former head of state for
internationally recognized crimes. 15 Within its decision, the court held that
the actions alleged to have been committed could in no way be regarded as
normal functions of a head of state, and thus no immunity could be had for
such activities.10 6 Yet this decision by the House of Lords was set aside as a
result of a potential bias, and a new panel heard the case. 10 7 In this
substituted decision, the new panel held that Pinochet could only be subject
to prosecution for those crimes he committed after 1988.'08 This substituted
decision by the House of Lords was a setback to the international human
rights community because of its failure to recognize that Pinochet could be
prosecuted pursuant to universal jurisdiction for his actions prior to 1988. It
implies that torture was not an international crime prior to the adoption of
the Torture Convention. By such impliction, the case can now be used as
102. Under the Nuremberg Charter persons charged with crimes against humanity,
crimes against the laws of war, and crimes against peace were subject to prosecution despite
their position as heads of state or governmental officials. See Nuremberg Charter, supra note
26, art. 7, 59 Stat. at 1556, 82 U.N.T.S. at 288. This principle was recently reaffirmed by the
creation of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
which allow former heads of state to be prosecuted for the human rights violations they
commit. See lCFY Statute, supra note 27, art. 7, para. 2, 32 I.L.M. at 1175; ICTR Statute,
supra note 27, art. 6, para. 2, 33 I.L.M. at 1604 (stating "the official position of any accused
person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall
not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment").
103. In re Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. at 84-85. Those cases cited in support of not
recognizing head of state immunity are international tribunals and have been organized for the
sole purpose of these criminal trials. In the case at hand, Spain was seeking to use its
domestic courts to prosecute Pinochet.
104. Id.
105. Regina v. Bartle, 37 I.L.M. 1302, 1334 (H.L. 1998).
106. Id. at 1333.
107. In re Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. at 432.

108. See Bartle, 38 I.L.M. at 619 (holding that Pinochet could only be extradited and
thus prosecuted for those acts of torture he committed after the Convention against Torture
became binding on the United Kingdom, Spain, and Chile).
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precedent to preclude a state from invoking universal jurisdiction to
prosecute individuals for torture prior to the enactment of the Torture
Convention.
IV. LIMITATIONS ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION

Although the expansion of universal jurisdiction limits a state's right to
hide behind its sovereignty, several factors exist which restrict its ability to
make a more dramatic impact. It is important to emphasize that universality
is a limited jurisdictional means. Although it has expanded over the years, it
still covers only those acts held by the international community to be
egregious violations of world peace. The crimes that are subject to universal
jurisdiction must be of such world-wide importance and threat to the human
race as to warrant this extraterritorial reach.
Additionally, universal jurisdiction does not grant a state the power to
invade another state's sovereign borders to essentially kidnap the individual
in order to bring them to justice in that state." 0 Therefore, if an individual
remains in the safe borders of a chosen country, that for whatever reason,
decides not to prosecute him, the individual will, in essence, escape
prosecution. Yet, upon leaving that state, any country can then request that
the person be extradited to stand trial in its national courts."' However, as is
evident by the recent attempt by Spain to have General Pinochet extradited
from England, this is not an easy step.
As previously noted, the evolution of the new "sovereign" brought with
it legal doctrines to protect its existence. Each of these doctrines can be used
by a state to avoid review of its actions by another sovereign. The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act is an almost absolute bar on jurisdiction in United
States courts for cases against a sovereign." 2 It is important to note,
however, that this is for suits brought against a state, or an individualfor his
an individual,
When
state is seeking
to rights,
prosecute
or her
acts.
a strong
argument
for aviolations
of human
such
as official
a foreign
president,

109.
110.
111.
112.
(1994).

See Joyner, supranote 50, at 165.
See generally Randall, supra note 51.
Id.
See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330-32, 1391, 1602-11

113. Id.
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exists to prevent this president from crying sovereign. 1 14 The illegal acts of
killing or torturing its citizens should not be considered official acts.
Likewise, a president's claim of head of state immunity would also fail. It is
clear in the international human rights context that a head of state is not free
from responsibility for such egregious crimes by reason of his official
position. This was clearly laid out in the Nuremberg Charter and recently
reaffirmed by the international tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda. Although some commentators have made the distinction that the
Nuremberg Charter, as well as the tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, only stand for the proposition that a head of state is not immune
from prosecution by an international tribunal, the recent decision by the
House of Lords declined to draw this distinction." 5 Because of such
arguments, however, a state wishing to invoke universal jurisdiction cannot
dismiss immunity claims lightly.
V.

CONCLUSION

As this article discussed, the use of the word sovereignty has evolved
over the years from a reference to the relationship between the sovereign and
its subjects, to its modern understanding as a description of the relationship
between states. This new understanding of sovereignty has been used by
governments and courts as a means of avoiding judgment or review. More
recently, with the birth of the human rights movement following the
discovery of the atrocities committed during World War II, the role of state
sovereignty is again changing form. As the human rights movement
continues to gain momentum and the idea of some form of international
human rights obligations become engrained, what will happen to this notion
of sovereignty? Although there are additional factors contributing to this
reformation of sovereignty," 16 the expansion of the acts subject to universal
jurisdiction by another state indirectly chips away at this concept without the
direct consent of the state itself.
With the creation of the ad hoc tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, the international community is sending a strong signal to the
114. In addition, as a result of the House of Lords decision denying immunity to
General Pinochet, the human rights community now has support for its contention that
sovereign immunity should not extend to human rights violations.
115. See id; Horowitz, supra note 24, at 515.
1.16. Other factors include globalization, the creation of the first international criminal
court, and the ever increasing use of treaties. For a detailed discussion on the effects of these
factors, see generally Henkin, supra note 1.
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individual nations of the world that the international community is not going
to idly stand by while its citizens' basic human rights are being violated. It
is no longer going to be acceptable to hide behind the wall of sovereignty.
Just as the Nuremberg trials held that it was not a defense that the defendant
was just following orders, sovereignty can not now be used to escape
prosecution for acts committed in the state's name. The former Yugoslavia
tribunal clearly addressed this idea in its first decision by stating:
It would be a travesty of law and a betrayal of the universal need
for justice, should the concept of State sovereignty be allowed to
be raised successfully against human rights. Borders should not be
considered as a shield against the reach of the law and as a
protection for those7 who trample underfoot the most elementary
rights of humanity!
This statement sends a clear warning to all future heads of state to respect
the human rights of the nationals of its state just as if those individuals were
not subject to their control. One commentator, while speaking on the lessons
from Nuremberg, hinted at what this new role of sovereignty should be. He
explained:
The fact is that unrestricted national sovereignty means, in real
terms, international anarchy. Nuremberg showed us that there must
be some limitations on national sovereignty if we are to have a
more secure world....
Nuremberg showed us that we must reach the behavior of
individuals to create a better world. That we must penetrate the
veil of national sovereignty and punish individuals for violations
of
18
international law if we are to give that law life and vitality.!
Thus, despite the fact that universal jurisdiction has rarely been invoked
throughout history, the world-wide acceptance of its expansion has led to the
reformation of our idea of sovereignty. And, although universal jurisdiction,
with its various limitations, cannot alone crumble this brick wall, we are
witnessing an evolution of a new concept of sovereignty-the creation of a
world-nation to act as a true keeper of its citizens. This new world-nation is

117. Prosecutor v. Tadic, 35 I.L.M. 32, 52 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yug.
1995).
118. Henry T. King, Jr., The Meaning of Nuremberg, 30 CASF.W. Rlis. J. INT'L L. 143,
147 (1998).
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one with no boundaries to act as a barrier to protect its people against
prosecution for crimes against humanity.
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